According to Lessig, those who think this is mere quid pro
quo are misled because first of all, there are now laws against such forms of
bribery, and, in the main, these laws are respected because of the consequences
imposed, and because the current system is very effective. In
fact, Lessig states: “it is the core argument of this book – that the most
significant and powerful forms of corruption today are precisely those that
thrive without depending upon quid pro quos for their effectiveness.” In fact, it is the relationships that are
built by this insider gift or ‘subsidy’ economy that are of prime importance to
the special interests. Lessig contends
that such a system is more dangerous than the old quid pro quo bribery
precisely because of the on-going relationships and access that result.
And so, with this summary in mind, it is time to look at
Professor Lessig’s proposed solutions for this systemic problem. He first admonishes the reader to remember
that our democracy does not have just one problem that a single reform would
fix. Indeed, he addresses two reforms
already being touted as enough. He says
they fall short. The first is
Transparency; the second, Anonymity.
As to “transparency”, Lessig maintains that it should not be
abandoned – there must be a disclosure listing of contributors to avoid the
more “grotesque forms of corruption.”
However, the problem with transparency is that it assumes the influence
in the system comes with the gift, but influence can actually be independent of
the amount spent on the candidate. He
makes the point that “there are many ways in which corporate wealth can be
translated into significant political influence that would never be revealed by
any system of disclosure alone.” For
instance, while listings of contributors and contributions are helpful, they do
not record threats to support an opposing candidate should the initial
recipient be recalcitrant in any way. He
concludes that transparency is being asked to carry too much weight in the
reform fight. Likewise, with anonymity,
which he dismisses by asserting that recipients would surely know something
about the sources of their campaign contributions; keeping sources completely
anonymous would be almost impossible. In
support of that claim, he cites the lengths to which we would have to go to
protect anonymity, as well as the lingering suspicions the public would have
about any contribution being “anonymous.”
To begin the discussion of reforms that would work to some
degree, he cites the fact that three states have already been experimenting
with campaign finance reform: Arizona, Maine and Connecticut. Each has adopted
a system of small dollar contributions as the basis for state office campaigns. Candidates qualify by raising a certain
number of small contributions, and then they can also receive state funding for
their campaigns. While they have
succeeded in increasing competiveness, Lessig doesn’t like the idea of
bureaucrats setting campaign spending limits or the amounts available to
candidates.
He then moves on to explain and support the Grant and
Franklin Project, based on the assumption that 90% of the People pay some
amount to the federal Treasury in taxes – at least $50 a person in income, gas
or cigarette tax. Given this assumption,
he expounds on this system:
1.
We convert the first fifty dollars that each
person contributes to the federal treasury into something called a “democracy
voucher.” Each voter then decides how to
allocate his/her voucher to a candidate or candidates. Candidates receiving vouchers must opt into
the system.
2.
If the voucher is not allocated to a candidate,
it then goes to the political party in which the voter is registered. If the voter isn’t registered in a party, it
then goes to support the administration of the system, to voter education or to
the G&F Project.
3.
Voters under this system are free to make
additional contributions to candidates – up to $100 per candidate.
4.
Any viable candidate for Congress could receive
such contributions if he/she agreed to fund his or her campaign exclusively
with democracy vouchers and contributions up to $100 from individual citizens. No PAC money and no contributions from
political parties.
Lessig says this system has a number of appealing special
features: 1) it’s voluntary; 2) does not allow “your money” to be used for
speech you don’t believe in; 3) permits personal contributions in addition to
the public funds (although he doesn’t think SCOTUS would agree with the low
limit of $100!); 4) unlike most systems, this one would inject enormous amounts
of money into the system (about $3 billion a year), thus having the potential
to produce much competition; and, 5) this is not a solution that says, ‘speak
less’ but ‘speak more’.”
The author makes it clear that this particular reform is the
key to everything else that follows. He
makes a valid point that if we are, as a nation, willing to spend upwards of
$750 billion on war in Iraq, presumably to make democracy work there, then we
should be willing to spend one-twenty-fifth of that to make democracy work at
home. But will it work? In so many cases, reforms have been defeated
by some new clever technique designed to ensure that money has more influence
than votes. Nonetheless, he believes
that this particular solution has more credibility than any other solution presented
in the past forty years, but he does admit that in order to resolve this problem
completely may require a constitutional amendment. In the meantime, this particular first step
toward a solution requires some strategies to bring it forward for serious
consideration by congress.
His first strategy holds some interest even though he rates
it as having only a 5% chance to work.
He makes the difficult-to-argue-with point that the most terrifying idea
for an incumbent is a primary challenge.
Thus, he proposes that across this country, we find “super-candidates” (citizen
activists; not politicians) to run in multiple districts at the same time on a
single clear platform: that they will remain in the race only as long as it
takes for the incumbent to publicly commit to supporting citizen-owned,
citizen-supported and controlled elections.
So how many of these super-candidates would it take to enter every
primary where the incumbent was not committed to election reform? He figures about three hundred! No wonder he also figures just a 5% chance to
work.
First, I’m not sure 300 such people with very special
qualifications can be found to commit to the travel, the pressure and the
activity required to perform this “super-candidacy.” Second, I’m not at all certain that the
public would see this as reform; they might view it as more of a gimmick on the
part of “liberals”. Finally, how do
these super-candidates – these non-politicians – manage to finance a campaign
of this sort when the only available adequate funding would have to come from
the very sources being opposed and excoriated?
In other words, there will not be
enough support for this from small contributors, nor from either Party, to make
it work. A 5% success rate may be
overblown.The second strategy presented is that of using the presidential election cycle to leverage fundamental change. The candidate would have to be credible and demonstrate a singular focus on removing fundamental corruption from the government. The candidate would make a two-part pledge: if elected, he/she would hold the government hostage until Congress enacts legislation to remove the fundamental corruption at the heart of our government. Second, once the reform program is enacted, the person elected would resign. No wonder again that he gives this strategy a 2% chance of happening. It won’t because the voting public will never accept the hostage-taking nor voting for a temporary President. Although Lessig modifies this strategy to say that even a “modest showing would spark an enormous amount of energy”, it is extremely doubtful that the voting public, already tired of “foolishness” in government, would get excited about this regency presidency. This surge in energy sounds hollow and contradictory when Lessig noted in his introduction that systemic corruption has taken its toll on participation by the “sensible middle” of the voting public mainly because of loss of trust in the system. This strategy does not seem designed to restore that trust or that needed participation.
And so, we are left with Lessig’s final strategy: a
constitutional convention; needed because “sometimes an institution becomes too
sick to fix itself.” While he argues
convincingly for this strategy, he misses the whole point about the Framers
motivation in their presentation of two quite difficult ways to modify our
Constitution (by the way, the second path to amendment of the Constitution –
the convention route—has never been used). In any case, the Founders were not trying to
involve the people in the amendment process, they were attempting to protect
the ruling class and their own instrument of government when they proposed the
two-fold amendment process. I have
spoken of this before and refer you to my Blog of 03/16/2014 for further
elucidation of this concept.
Of far greater importance is to understand something that
Lessig does not approach. The most
important amendment needed is one that makes it truly probable and possible for
the People to control the process. I
have also spoken of that in another Blog published on 05/26/2014. It is imperative that the people take back
their rightful place as a branch of this government and that we have a
dedicated process for amending the constitution which can work to involve a
broad spectrum of the electorate.
So, while thanking Lawrence Lessig
for his assertion that election process reform is a necessary first step toward
diminishing our “dependence corruption”, our strategy must be to bring about a
People’s amendment for amending the Constitution. Then, and only then, can we enshrine electoral
reform, including at least: public financing, limited citizen contributions, no
gifts from outside sources, no equating of corporations with individuals, and
the goal of direct elections without an intervening Electoral College
originally designed to place the elite in a position to elect the President.
Let us remind ourselves that what the Framers wrought is
still capitalized upon by the elitists of our day. The latter tinker with voting rights; they
distort the Electoral College; they use big money to corrupt the legislative
and regulatory processes, and they establish a dependency upon their money and
power that threatens the very existence of our representative democracy. They have deviated from THE TRUE PURPOSE of
our Republic: to serve the People, not the richest few who can hire lobbyists
to deliver their message and their demands along with their largesse. Income inequality is bad enough; voting
inequality and the unequal immediate access by powerful special interests to
legislators and regulators is intolerable.
We The People must re-assert our rightful place as a functioning branch
of this government. 
