What did we learn about Benghazi during the recent Select
Committee 11-hour grilling of Hillary Clinton?
Not much, because:
- the questions were so
often unrelated to Benghazi
- the questioners, at least
on the Republican side, were intent on attacking the witness, not in
ferreting out the problems and solutions that might actually be related to
the attack upon our embassy in Benghazi.
- the questions from
Republicans were personal, not investigative
- this was not a serious
hearing held by a reasonable and intelligent committee; but admittedly a political event
meant to tarnish the reputation and campaign of a democratic contender for
the presidency (confirmed by remarks of at least three Republican Congressmen,
including Richard Hanna of NY’s 22nd Congressional District)
- It was about Hillary’s
emails, not Benghazi
- It was about Sidney
Blumenthal who wasn’t in Benghazi; wasn’t a government official; wasn’t a
State Department member, but a friendly contact of Bill and Hillary who
apparently has much to say about many issues
- It was about Hillary’s
staff, not about security staff in Benghazi
- It was about the parsing
of words, not about the power of actions on behalf of Benghazi staff and
their families.
- what is needed to improve
security at foreign embassies and diplomatic locations
- the amount of money being
spent on guarding our embassies, or how much more is needed
- how many private contractors
are guarding our embassies and how effective they are
- which congressmen have
voted for and against cuts in embassy security
- what decision-making process
is in place for requesting more security
- how that decision-making
process is failing and how it is working well; how it can be improved
- how the ARB report applies
to Benghazi and how it can be used to reform the security of our
diplomatic people and buildings
- who killed our people in
Benghazi; how do we bring them to justice?
- why members of the armed
forces stationed in risky countries are not automatically assigned to
guard our diplomatic people and embassies
- whether there is any plan
to increase the security budget
I have seen congressional hearings on TV,
and have experienced the operations of some committees before which I had opportunity to
testify. I do not remember anything
quite like this! This was without
question, a politicizing of an occurrence that involved a tragic outcome: the
death of four members of the diplomatic and security team at the Benghazi
facility. The basic questions that
needed to be asked never got much attention:
- How could this tragedy
have been avoided or averted?
- Why weren’t troops or
contractors available to help that night?
- Why were some of the
ambassador’s requests for security upgrades not answered or denied?
- What constitutes adequate
protection for our diplomatic staff and locations?
- Do we need a better rating
system for determining the strength of embassy protection?
- Should we have a full evaluation
of our current State Department on-going plans (and emergency Plans) for
protecting our facilities?
- What happened moment by
moment when the compound was attacked (the ARB Timeline could have been
used to go through the events step-by-step in order to make
recommendations as to what might be done in similar future circumstances)?
- What might have been improved or done differently without
judgments of character or personality; what alternative actions might be useful in future circumstances?
The special Accountability Review Board (ARB) Report made several significant recommendations but at no time did the
Select Committee ask the witness how she regarded them, nor did they question
her reasons for putting some in effect but not others. Above all, the committee
members did not ask her what she would have personally recommended be done in
the future. To be somewhat investigative
ourselves, let us look at some of the findings of the ARB.
Their PURPOSE:
“As called for by the Act (Title III of the Omnibus
Diplomatic and Antiterrorism Act of 1986), this report examines: whether the
attacks were security related; whether security systems and procedures were
adequate and implemented properly; the impact of intelligence and information
availability; whether any other facts or circumstances in these cases may be
relevant to appropriate security management of U.S. missions worldwide; and,
finally, whether any U.S. government employee or contractor, as defined by the
Act, breached her or his duty.”
Their FINDINGs:
1. The attacks were security related, involving arson, small
arms and machine gun fire, and the use of RPGs, grenades, and mortars against
U.S. personnel at two separate facilities – the SMC and the Annex – and en
route between them. Responsibility for
the tragic loss of life, injuries, and damage to U.S. facilities and property
rests solely and completely with the terrorists who perpetrated the attacks.
The Board concluded that there was no protest prior to the attacks, which were
unanticipated in their scale and intensity.
2. Systemic failures and leadership and management
deficiencies at senior levels within two bureaus of the State Department (the
“Department”) resulted in a Special Mission security posture that was
inadequate for Benghazi and grossly inadequate to deal with the attack that
took place. Security in Benghazi was not
recognized and implemented as a “shared responsibility” by the bureaus in
Washington charged with supporting the post… That said, Embassy Tripoli did not
demonstrate strong and sustained advocacy with Washington for increased
security for Special Mission Benghazi.
Overall, the number of Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)
security staff in Benghazi on the day of the attack and in the months and weeks
leading up to it was inadequate, despite repeated requests from Special Mission
Benghazi and Embassy Tripoli for additional staffing. At the
same time, dependence on the armed but poorly skilled Libyan February
17 Martyrs’ Brigade (February 17) militia members and unarmed, locally
contracted Blue Mountain Libya (BML) guards for security support was misplaced.
Among various Department bureaus and personnel in the field,
there appeared to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was responsible
and empowered to make decisions based on both policy and security
considerations.
3. Notwithstanding the proper implementation of security
systems and procedures and remarkable heroism shown by American personnel,
those systems and the Libyan response fell short… The Board found the responses by both the BML
guards and ‘February 17’ to be inadequate. The Board found the Libyan government’s
response to be profoundly lacking on the night of the attacks, reflecting both
weak capacity and near absence of central government influence and control in
Benghazi. .
The Board determined that U.S. personnel on the ground in
Benghazi performed with courage and readiness to risk their lives to protect
their colleagues, in a near impossible situation. The Board members believe
every possible effort was made to rescue and recover Ambassador
Stevens and Sean Smith. The interagency response was timely and appropriate,
but there simply was not enough time for armed U.S. military assets to have
made a difference.
4. The Board found that intelligence provided no immediate,
specific tactical warning of the September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in
the intelligence community’s understanding of extremist militias in Libya and
the potential threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats
were known to exist.
5. The Board found that certain senior State Department
officials within two bureaus demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership and
management ability in their responses to security concerns posed by Special
Mission Benghazi, given the deteriorating threat environment and the lack of
reliable host government protection. However, the Board did not find reasonable
cause to determine that any individual U.S. government employee breached his or
her duty.
Their RECOMMENDATIONs:
The ARB made a substantial number of recommendations within
the context of six categories. (I have chosen to include details because they have not been adequately addressed elsewhere.)
OVERARCHING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
1. The Department
must strengthen security for personnel and platforms beyond traditional
reliance on host government security support in high risk, high threat posts.
The Department should urgently review the proper balance between acceptable
risk and expected outcomes in high risk, high threat areas. Assessments must be made on a case-by case basis
and repeated as circumstances change.
2. The Board
recommends that the Department re-examine DS (Bureau of Diplomatic Security) organization and management, with
a particular emphasis on span of control for security policy planning for all
overseas U.S. diplomatic facilities. In this context, the recent creation of a
new Diplomatic Security Deputy Assistant Secretary for High Threat Posts could
be a positive first step if integrated into a sound strategy for DS
reorganization.
3. As the
President’s personal representative, the Chief of Mission bears “direct and
full responsibility for the security of [his or her] mission and all the personnel
for whom [he or she is] responsible,” and thus for risk management in the
country to which he or she is accredited. In Washington, each regional Assistant
Secretary has a corresponding responsibility to support the Chief of Mission in
executing this duty. Regional bureaus should have augmented support within the
bureau on security matters, to include a senior DS officer to report to the
regional Assistant Secretary.
4. The Department
should establish a panel of outside independent experts (military, security,
humanitarian) with experience in high risk, high threat areas to support DS,
identify best practices (from other agencies and other countries), and
regularly evaluate U.S. security platforms in high risk, high threat posts. (The Board defines “high risk, high threat”
posts as those in countries with high to critical levels of political violence
and terrorism, governments of weak capacity, and security platforms that fall
well below established standards.)
5. The Department
should develop minimum security standards for occupancy of temporary facilities
in high risk, high threat environments, and seek greater flexibility for the
use of Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) sources of funding so that they can be rapidly made
available for security upgrades at such facilities.
6. Before opening
or re-opening critical threat or high risk, high threat posts, the Department
should establish a multi-bureau support cell, residing in the regional bureau.
The support cell should work to expedite the approval and funding for
establishing and operating the post, implementing physical security measures,
staffing of security and management personnel, and providing equipment,
continuing as conditions at the post require.
7. All State
Department and other government agencies’ facilities should be co-located when
they are in the same metropolitan area, unless a waiver has been approved.
8. The Secretary
should require an action plan from DS, OBO and other relevant offices on the
use of fire as a weapon against diplomatic facilities, including immediate
steps to deal with urgent issues. The report should also include reviews of
fire safety and crisis management training for all employees and dependents,
safe-haven standards and fire safety equipment, and recommendations to
facilitate survival in smoke and fire situations.
9. Tripwires are
too often treated only as indicators of threat rather than an essential trigger
mechanism for serious risk management decisions and actions. The Department
should revise its guidance to posts and require key offices to perform in-depth
status checks of post tripwires.
10. The State
Department must work with Congress to restore the Capital Security Cost Sharing
Program at its full capacity, adjusted for inflation to approximately $2.2 billion
in fiscal year 2015, including an up to ten-year program addressing that need,
prioritized for construction of new facilities in high risk, high threat areas.
It should also work with Congress to expand utilization of
Overseas Contingency Operations funding to respond to emerging security threats
and vulnerabilities and operational requirements in high risk, high threat
posts.
11. The Board
supports the State Department’s initiative to request additional Marines and expand
the Marine Security Guard (MSG) Program – as well as corresponding requirements
for staffing and funding. The Board also recommends that the State Department and DoD identify
additional flexible MSG structures and request further resources for the Department
and DoD to provide more capabilities and capacities at higher risk posts.
STAFFING HIGH RISK, HIGH THREAT POSTS
12. The Board
strongly endorses the Department’s request for increased DS personnel for high-
and critical-threat posts and for additional Mobile Security Deployment teams,
as well as an increase in DS domestic staffing in support of such action.
13. The
Department should assign key policy, program, and security personnel at high
risk, high threat posts for a minimum of one year. The ARB suggests a
comprehensive review of human resources authorities with an eye to using those
authorities to promote sending more experienced officers, including “When
Actually Employed” (WAE) personnel, to these high risk, high threat locations,
particularly in security and management positions for longer periods of time.
14. The
Department needs to review the staffing footprints at high risk, high threat posts,
with particular attention to ensuring adequate Locally Employed Staff (LES) and
management support. High risk, high threat posts must be funded and the human
resources process prioritized to hire LES interpreters and translators.
15. With
increased and more complex diplomatic activities in the Middle East, the Department
should enhance its on-going efforts to significantly upgrade its language
capacity, especially Arabic, among American employees, including DS, and
receive greater resources to do so.
TRAINING AND AWARENESS
16. A panel of
Senior Special Agents and Supervisory Special Agents should revisit DS
high-threat training with respect to active internal defense and fire survival as
well as Chief of Mission protective detail training.
17. The
Diplomatic Security Training Center and Foreign Service Institute should collaborate
in designing joint courses that integrate high threat training and risk management
decision processes for senior and mid-level DS agents and Foreign Service
Officers and better prepare them for leadership positions in high risk, high
threat posts. They should consult throughout the U.S. government for best practices
and lessons learned. Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training should be
mandatory for high risk, high threat posts, whether an individual is assigned permanently or in longer-term temporary duty status.
SECURITY AND FIRE SAFETY EQUIPMENT
18. The
Department should ensure provision of adequate fire safety and security equipment
for safe havens and safe areas in non-Inman/SECCA facilities, as well as high
threat Inman facilities. (“Inman buildings” are diplomatic facilities that meet
the mandatory minimum physical security standards established after the 1985
Inman Report. SECCA refers to the Secure Embassy Construction and
Counterterrorism Act of 1999 that mandated standards for newly acquired diplomatic
facilities)
19. There have
been technological advancements in non-lethal deterrents, and the State
Department should ensure it rapidly and routinely identifies and procures additional
options for non-lethal deterrents in high risk, high threat posts and trains
personnel on their use.
20. DS should
upgrade surveillance cameras at high risk, high threat posts for greater
resolution, nighttime visibility, and monitoring capability beyond post.
INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS
21. Post-2001,
intelligence collection has expanded exponentially, but the Benghazi attacks
are a stark reminder that we cannot over-rely on the certainty or even likelihood
of warning intelligence. Careful attention should be given to factors showing a
deteriorating threat situation in general as a basis for improving security
posture. Key trends must be quickly identified and used to sharpen risk calculations.
22. The DS Office
of Intelligence and Threat Analysis should report directly to the DS Assistant
Secretary and directly supply threat analysis to all DS components, regional
Assistant Secretaries and Chiefs of Mission in order to get key security-related threat information into the right
hands more rapidly.
PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY
23. The Board
recognizes that poor performance does not ordinarily constitute a breach of
duty that would serve as a basis for disciplinary action but is instead addressed
through the performance management system. However, the Board is of the view
that findings of unsatisfactory leadership performance by senior officials in
relation to the security incident under review should be a potential basis for
discipline recommendations by future ARBs, and would recommend a revision of
Department regulations or amendment to the relevant statute to this end.
24. The Board was
humbled by the courage and integrity shown by those on the ground in Benghazi
and Tripoli. In particular the DS agents
and Annex team who defended their colleagues; the Tripoli response team which
mobilized without hesitation; those in Benghazi and Tripoli who cared for the
wounded; and the many U.S. government employees who served in Benghazi under difficult
conditions in the months leading up to the September 11-12 attacks which
epitomized the highest ideals of government service.
Their CONCLUSION:
“The ARB has examined the terrorist attacks in Benghazi with
an eye towards how we can better advance American interests and protect our
personnel in an increasingly complex and dangerous world. This Board presents
its findings and recommendations with the unanimous conclusion that while the
United States cannot retreat in the face of such challenges, we must work more
rigorously and adeptly to address them, and that American diplomats and
security professionals, like their military colleagues, serve the nation in an inherently
risky profession.”
MY CONCLUSION:
I have gone on at length here because I am certain that few
ordinary citizens have actually read this information, and are therefore
unaware of the depth and detail that has already been garnered by a
distinguished panel of experts. The Congressional
Select Committee, in stark contrast, chose to deal with nothing but political
posturing, innuendo, and potentially slanderous implications. A serious investigation might well have built
upon this ARB Report, particularly concerning the detailed Timeline presented
in that Report, and as to the 24 recommendations it produced.
